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Abstract
The overlapping expectations and the collective absence of arbitrage con-
ditions introduced in the economic literature to insure existence of Pareto
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as a weak no-arbitrage and a weak collective absence of arbitrage condi-
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1 Introduction
The problem of the existence and characterization of Pareto optima and equi-
libria in markets with short-selling, an old problem in the economic literature,
has recently been addressed by Barrieu and El Karoui [4], Jouini et al [15],
Filipovic and Kupper [9] and Burgert and Ru¨schendorf [6] for convex measures
of risk in infinite markets. Existence of an equilibrium for finite markets where
short sales are allowed has first been considered in the early seventies by Grand-
mont [11], Hart [13], Green [12]. Debreu’s standard theorems on existence of
equilibrium which assume that the sets of portfolios that investors may hold
are bounded below could not be applied. In these early papers, investors were
assumed to hold a single homogeneous or heterogeneous probabilistic belief and
be von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM), risk averse utility maximizers. Two suf-
ficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium were given:
- the overlapping expectations condition which expresses that investors are suf-
ficiently similar in their beliefs and risk tolerances so that there exists a non
empty set of prices (the no-arbitrage prices) for which no agent can make cost-
less unbounded vNM utility nondecreasing purchases
-the no unbounded utility arbitrage condition, a collective absence of arbitrage
condition, which requires that investors do not engage in mutually compatible,
utility nondecreasing trades.
These conditions have later been weakened and shown to be equivalent under
adequate assumptions and under further assumptions, necessary for existence
of equilibrium (see e.g. Page [19], Page and Wooders [20]). They have been
generalized to abstract economies (see Werner [24] and Nielsen [17]). Other suf-
ficient conditions were given, in particular that the individually rational utility
set (see section 2 for a definition) be compact. For a review of the subject
in finite dimension and references, see Allouch et al [1], Dana et al [7], Page
[18],[21]. The theory has also been developed for infinite markets. However,
since the early work of Kreps [16], it is well known in finance that the concept
of arbitrage opportunity used for finite markets is too weak for infinite markets.
For finite markets, the no arbitrage condition or the no unbounded utility arbi-
trage condition insure existence of agents’ demand for no-arbitrage prices and
the compactness of the set of individually rational attainable allocations (see
Nielsen [17]). These conditions break down in infinite dimension (see Brown
and Werner [5]). The compactness of the individually rational utility set re-
mains a sufficient condition for existence of equilibria (see Dana et al [8]) but
it is in general difficult to provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of an
economy to insure that condition.
This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Pareto optima and
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equilibria when agents use convex measures of risk in finite markets with short-
selling. In contrast, with the papers of Barrieu and El Karoui [4] who deal
with families of ρ-dilated risk measures and Jouini et al [15] who consider law
invariant convex monetary utilities, it makes no specific assumptions on the risk
measures. However it assumes that there is a finite number of states of the world
and uses finite dimensional convex analysis techniques. It builds on one hand, on
the economic literature on equilibrium with short-selling and on the other hand
on a paper by Heath and Ku [14]. Heath and Ku introduced a condition that
they called the Pareto equilibrium’s condition which requires that if investors do
engage in mutually compatible, utility nondecreasing trades, then those trades
do not increase their utilities. They showed the equivalence between the Pareto
equilibrium’s condition and an overlapping sets of priors condition (see their
proposition 4.2). They however did not address the question of existence of
Pareto optima and equilibria. We show that, for risk measures, and for finite
markets, the Pareto equilibrium condition coincides with a weakening of the
no unbounded utility arbitrage condition, that the overlapping sets of priors
condition is a condition of existence of weak no- arbitrage price and that any of
the conditions introduced by Heath and Ku imply existence of Pareto optima
and Arrow Debreu equilibria by applying standard results in the theory of
equilibrium with consumption sets unbounded below. The same conclusion is
also obtained by using a sup-convolution type of technique. Following Heath
and Ku, the case of constraints is also studied.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and recall
standard concepts in equilibrium theory. Section 3 defines the concepts of useful
and useless trading directions, that of a no-arbitrage price (weak no-arbitrage
price) and of collective absence of arbitrage. Two existence of an equilibrium
theorems are recalled. Section 4 deals with existence of efficient allocations and
equilibria. Sufficient conditions are provided based on one hand on classical
economic theory theorems and on the other hand on the sup-convolution. Nec-
essary conditions are also provided. Section 5 deals with the case of constraints
on trades.
2 The model
We consider a standard Arrow-Debreu model of complete contingent security
markets. There are two dates, 0 and 1. At date 0, there is uncertainty about
which state s from a state space Ω = {1, ..., k} will occur at date 1. At date
0, agents trade contingent claims for date 1. The space of contingent claims
is the set of random variables from Ω → R. The random variable X which
equals x1 in state 1, x2 in state 2 and xk in state k, is identified with the
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vector X = (x1, . . . , xk). Let 4 = {pi ∈ Rk+ :
∑k
s=1 pis = 1} be the prob-
ability simplex in Rk and pi ∈ 4. We note Epi(X) :=
∑k
l=1 pilxl and for
p ∈ Rk, p ·X :=∑kl=1 plxl.
There are m agents indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m. Agent i has an endowment
Ei ∈ Rk of contingent claims. Let E =∑mi=1Ei denote aggregate endowment.
We assume that each agent has a preference order i over Rk represented by a
monetary utility function V i where we recall that
Definition 1 A function V : Rk → R is a monetary utility function if it is
concave monotone and has the cash invariance property
V (X + C) = V (X) + C, for any X ∈ Rk, C constant
A positively homogeneous monetary utility function is a monetary utility func-
tion that is positively homogeneous.
Monetary utility functions can be identified with convex measures of risk
(see Fo¨llmer and Schied [10]) and positively homogeneous monetary utility func-
tions with coherent risk measures(see Artzner et al [2]) by defining ρ = −V .
We recall that monetary utility functions have the following representation
V (X) = min
pi∈4
Epi(X) + c(pi) (1)
where
c(pi) = sup
X∈Rk
V (X)− Epi(X) ∈ R ∪ {+∞} (2)
which is convex, lower semi-continuous, is the conjuguate function of V . Let
P = dom c (3)
be the set of effective priors associated with V . Clearly, we also have:
V (X) = min
pi∈P
Epi(X) + c(pi) (4)
Positively homogeneous monetary utility functions are obtained when c is
an indicator function δP (in other words, c(pi) = 0 if pi ∈ P and c(pi) = ∞
otherwise). In that case, P = {pi ∈ 4 : c(pi) = 0} is a convex compact subset
of 4 and we have
V (X) = min
pi∈P
Epi(X)
We next recall standard concepts in equilibrium theory.
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An allocation (Xi)mi=1 ∈ (Rk)m is attainable if
∑m
i=1X
i = E.
The set of individually rational attainable allocations A is defined by
A =
{
(Xi)mi=1 ∈ (Rk)m |
m∑
i=1
Xi = E and V i(Xi) ≥ V i(Ei) for all i
}
.
The individually rational utility set U is defined by
U =
{
(v1, v2, ..., vm) ∈ Rm | ∃(Xi)mi=1 ∈ A s. t. V i(Ei) ≤ vi ≤ V i(Xi), ∀ i
}
.
Definition 2 An attainable allocation (Xi)mi=1 is Pareto optimal if there does
not exist (Xi
′
)mi=1 attainable such that V
i(Xi
′
) ≥ V i(Xi) for all i with a strict
inequality for some i. It is individually rational Pareto optimal if it is Pareto
optimal and V i(Xi) ≥ V i(Ei) for all i.
Definition 3 A pair (X∗, p∗) ∈ A × Rk\{0} is a contingent Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium if
1. for each agent i and Xi ∈ Rk, V i(Xi) > V (X∗i) implies p∗ ·Xi > p∗ ·X∗i,
2. for each agent i, p∗ ·X∗i = p∗ · Ei.
Assertions 1 and 2 express that X∗i solves investor’s i maximization prob-
lem at price p∗. Markets clear since X∗ is attainable.
We shall use the following notations. Given a subset A ⊆ Rp, int A is the
interior of A, cl A is the closure of A. For A convex, ri A is the relative interior
of A, A0 = {p ∈ Rp | p ·X ≤ 0, for all X ∈ A} is the polar of A.
3 Useful vectors and no-arbitrage concepts
In this section, we recall a number of standard concept in the theory of equilib-
rium with short-selling. We first define and characterize for monetaries utilities
the useful (useless) trading direction. We next define the concept of a no-
arbitrage price (weak no-arbitrage price) as a price giving strictly positive value
to any useful non zero vector (useful and not useless vector). We then recall
concepts of collective absence of arbitrage and two existence of an equilibrium
theorems.
3.1 Useful vectors
Let V be a monetary utility of type (4). For X ∈ Rk, let
P̂ (X) = {Y ∈ Rk | V (Y ) ≥ V (X)}
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be the set of contingent claims preferred to X and R(X) be its asymptotic cone
(see Rockafellar [22], section 8). Since V is concave, by Rockafellar’s theorem
8.7 in [22], R(X) is independent of X. It will be simply denoted by R. It is
called the set of useful vectors for V in the economic literature. We recall that
R = {W ∈ Rk | V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0}.
The lineality space of V or set of useless vectors is defined by
L = {W ∈ Rk |V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ∈ R} = R ∩ (−R).
We first characterize R.
Proposition 1 We have
R = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P}
L = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) = 0, for all pi ∈ P}
There exists pi ∈ int P if and only if L = {0}.
Proof : Let W fulfill Epi(W ) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P . Then
V (λW ) = min
pi∈P
Epi(λW ) + c(pi) ≥ min
pi∈P
c(pi) = V (0) for all λ ≥ 0
which implies that W ∈ R. Conversely, let W ∈ R. Then
V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0,
hence Epi(λW )+c(pi) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0, pi ∈ P . For a fixed pi ∈ P , the map
λ → λEpi(W ) is bounded below, hence Epi(W ) ≥ 0. The proofs of the other
assertions are straightforward.
For further use, let Ri be the set of useful vectors corresponding to V i.
3.2 Concepts of absence of arbitrage
The first concept that we recall is that of a no-arbitrage price, a price for which
no agent can make costless unbounded utility nondecreasing purchases.
Definition 4 A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price” for i if p·W > 0,
for all W ∈ Ri\{0}. A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price” for the
economy if it is a no-arbitrage price for each agent.
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Let Si denote the set of no arbitrage prices for i. Then Si = int − (Ri)0.
A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price” for the economy if and only if
p ∈ ∩iSi = ∩iint− (Ri)0.
From Rockafellar’s [22] corollary 14.6.1, Si 6= ∅ if and only if Li = {0}.
Therefore, there exists a no-arbitrage price for the economy only if Li = {0} for
all i. This leads us to introduce a weaker no-arbitrage concept due to Werner
[24].
Definition 5 A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” weak no-arbitrage price” for agent
i if p ·W > 0 for all W ∈ Ri\ Li. A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ”weak no-arbitrage
price” for the economy if it is a weak no-arbitrage price for each agent.
If p is a weak no-arbitrage price for i, then for everyW ∈ Ri∩(Li)⊥\{0} and
W ′ ∈ Li, αW +βW ′ ∈ Ri\Li for every α > 0, β ∈ R. Hence p · (αW +βW ′) =
αp ·W + βp ·W ′ > 0 for every α > 0, β ∈ R. Therefore p ·W ′ = 0 for any
W ′ ∈ Li. In other words a ”weak no-arbitrage price” for i gives 0 value to
any useless trade for i. Hence p is a ” weak no-arbitrage price” for agent i if
p ∈ (Li)⊥ and p ·W > 0 for all W ∈ (Ri ∩ (Li)⊥)\{0}. The converse is trivially
true. Let Siw denote the set of weak no arbitrage prices for i. We have the
following characterization of Siw.
Lemma 1 The set of weak no-arbitrage prices for i, Siw = ri − (Ri)0. Hence
the set of weak no arbitrage prices for the economy is ∩iSiw = ∩iri(−(Ri)0).
For a proof, the reader is refered to Allouch et al [1], lemma 2.
Let us now characterize the set of no-arbitrages prices and weak no-arbitrage
prices.
Proposition 2 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then
1. the set of non arbitrage prices for agent i is Si = cone int P i,
2. the set of non arbitrage prices for the economy is ∩
i
Si = cone ∩
i
int P i,
3. the set of weak no arbitrage prices for agent i is Siw = cone ri P
i
4. the set of weak no arbitrage prices for the economy is ∩iSiw = cone ∩i ri P i
Proof : From proposition 1, Ri = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P i},
hence the set of no-arbitrage prices for i, Si = int cl cone P i. Since cone P i is
convex, int cl cone P i = int cone P i and
Si = int cone P i = cone int P i. (5)
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The set of no-arbitrage prices for the economy
∩
i
Si = ∩
i
int cone P i = cone ∩
i
int P i (6)
From lemma 1 and from Rockafellar’s [22] theorem 6.3 and corollary 6.6.1, the
set of weak no arbitrage prices for i,
Siw = ri − (Ri)0 = ri cl cone P i = ri cone P i = cone riP i (7)
Hence the set of weak no arbitrage prices for the economy is
∩iSiw = ∩iri − (Ri)0 = ∩iri(coneP i) = ∩icone (riP i) = cone ∩i riP i (8)
We now turn to concepts of collective absence of arbitrage.
Let us first recall the no-unbounded-arbitrage condition denoted now on by
NUBA introduced by Page [19] which requires inexistence of an unbounded set
of mutually compatible net trades which are utility nondecreasing.
Definition 6 The economy satisfies the NUBA condition if
∑
iW
i = 0 and
W i ∈ Ri for all i, implies W i = 0 for all i.
Let us also recall a weaker condition, called the Weak No-Market-Arbitrage
condition, introduced by Hart [13] which requires that all mutually compatible
net trades which are utility nondecreasing be useless.
Definition 7 The economy satisfies the Weak No-Market-Arbitrage condition
(WNMA) if
∑
iW
i = 0 and W i ∈ Ri for all i implies W i ∈ Li, for all i.
The following proposition follows directly from proposition 1.
Proposition 3 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then
1. the economy satisfies NUBA if there exists no set of net trades W 1, . . . ,Wn
W i 6= 0 for all i with Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i and all i and
∑
iW
i = 0,
2. the economy satisfies WNMA if there exists no set of net trades W 1, . . . ,Wn
with Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i and all i with a strict inequality for some
i and pi ∈ P i and ∑iW i = 0.
WNMA has been introduced by Heath and Ku [14] under the name of Pareto
equilibrium.
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3.3 Existence of equilibrium theorems
We end this section by recalling two theorems obtained in the literature on
equilibrium with short-selling:
Theorem 1 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then the following assertions are
equivalent
1. ∩
i
Si 6= ∅
2. NUBA is fulfilled,
3. the set of individually rational attainable allocations A is compact.
Any of the previous assertion imply any of the following assertions:
4. The individually rational utility set U is compact,
5. there exists an individually rational Pareto optimal allocation,
6. there exists an equilibrium.
Proof : See e.g. Page and Wooders [20], Dana et al [7].
Theorem 2 Let V i fulfill (4 ) for each i. Then the following equivalent asser-
tions are equivalent.
1. ∩
i
Siw 6= ∅
2. WNMA is fulfilled.
Any of the previous assertions imply any of the following assertions:
1. the individually rational utility set U is compact,
2. there exists a Pareto optimal allocation,
3. there exists an equilibrium.
Proof : See e.g. Page et al [21], Allouch et al [1].
Theorem 1 make stronger requirements than theorem 2, which are equiva-
lent to assuming that the set of individually rational attainable allocations is
compact. It follows from theorem 2 by assuming Li = {0} for all i. On can
show (see Allouch et al [1]) that the requirements of theorem 2 are equivalent
to assuming that the projection of the set of individually rational attainable
allocations onto Πmi=1(L
i)⊥ is compact. Finally when the utilities are strictly
concave, then all the conditions of theorem 1 are equivalent.
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4 Existence of efficient allocations and Equilibria
4.1 Sufficient conditions for existence of efficient allocations
and equilibria
Next proposition follows from theorem 1 and propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then the following are equivalent:
1. ∩
i
intP i 6= ∅
2. there exists no set of net trades W 1, . . . ,Wn, W i 6= 0 for all i with
Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i and all i and
∑
iW
i = 0,
3. the set of individually rational attainable allocations A is compact.
Any of the previous assertions imply any of the following assertions:
4. there exists an individually rational Pareto optimal allocation,
5. there exists an equilibrium.
In order to give an economic interpretation of Heath and Ku’s Pareto equi-
librium condition, let P i = dom ci be the set of effective priors associated with
V i a monetary utility for agent i. Consider the following incomplete preferences
on pairs (X,Y ) ∈ Rk × Rk defined by
X P i Y iff Epi(X)  Epi(Y ) for all pi ∈ P i (9)
Given P = (P i)mi=1 the set of effective priors of the m agents, an attainable
allocation (Xi)mi=1 is P-Pareto optimal if there does not exist a set of net
trades (W i)mi=1 with
∑
iW
i = 0 such that Epi(Xi +W i) ≥ Epi(Xi) for all i and
all pi ∈ P i with a strict inequality for some i and some pi ∈ P i. Equivalently
there does not exist a set of net trades (W i)mi=1 with
∑
iW
i = 0 such that
Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all i and all pi ∈ P i with a strict inequality for some i and some
pi ∈ P i. Hence, for the incomplete preference defined by (9), either any at-
tainable allocation is P-Pareto optimal or no attainable allocation is P-Pareto
optimal.
The next theorem which follows from theorem 2 and propositions 2 and 3 may
be viewed as an alaboration of Heath and Ku’s [14] proposition 4.2 which shows
the equivalence between existence of a weak no-arbitrage price and WNMA. It
establishes sufficient conditions for existence of a Pareto allocation or equiva-
lently of an equilibrium for monetary utilities.
Theorem 3 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then the following are equivalent:
1. ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅,
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2. there exists no set of net trades W 1, . . . ,Wn, with Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all
pi ∈ P i and all i with a strict inequality for some i and pi ∈ P i and∑
iW
i = 0,
3. any attainable allocation is P-Pareto optimal.
Any of the previous assertions imply any of the following assertions:
4. there exists an individually rational Pareto optimal allocation,
5. there exists an equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Let V i fulfill (4 ) for each i. If P i is independent of i, then
there exists an individually rational Pareto optimal allocation and there exists
an equilibrium.
Proof : Let P be the common set of probabilities and Sw be the set of weak
no-arbitrage price. Since P is convex, ri P 6= ∅. From proposition 6 assertion
2, Sw 6= ∅.
4.2 Necessary conditions for existence of equilibria
Proposition 6 and theorem 3 provide sufficient conditions for existence of effi-
cient allocations (or of an equilibrium). We next give necessary conditions for
existence of an efficient allocations.
Proposition 5 Let V i fulfill (4 ) for each i. If there exists an efficient alloca-
tions, then
1. ∩
i
P i 6= ∅,
2. there does not exist a set of trades W 1, . . . , Wn fulfilling Epi(W i) > 0 for
all pi ∈ P i and for all i and ∑iW i = 0,
3. the individually rational utility set U is bounded,
4. If (p∗, (X∗i)mi=1) is an equilibrium, then p
∗ ∈ ∩
i
P i and p∗ ·W > 0 for any
W fulfilling Epi(W ) > 0 for all pi ∈ P i for some i.
Proof : We first prove assertion one. Since there exists an equilibrium (X∗, p∗),
for every i, there exists λi > 0, such that p∗ ∈ λiδV i(X∗i). As δV i(X∗i) ⊆ P i,
for each i, there exists pii ∈ P i such that λipii is independent of i. Hence λi
and pii are independent of i and pi ∈ ∩
i
P i 6= ∅ as was to be proven. The second
assertion is obvious. To prove the third assertion, for any (zi) ∈ U , there exists
(X1, X2, ..., Xm) ∈ A such that
V i(Ei) ≤ zi ≤ V i(Xi), for all i. (10)
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Since ∩
i
P i 6= ∅, let pi ∈ ∩
i
P i. We have V i(Xi) ≤ Epi(Xi) + ci(pi), thus, from
(10),
mi = V i(Ei)− ci(pi) ≤ Epi(Xi).
Since for all i, Epi(Xi) is bounded below by mi, it is bounded above by M i =
Epi(E)−
∑
l 6=im
l. From (10), we thus have
V i(Ei) ≤ zi ≤ V i(Xi) ≤M i + ci(pi) for all i
and U is bounded. To prove the last assertion, clearly p∗ ∈ ∩
i
P i. Let W fulfill
Epi(W ) > 0 for all pi ∈ P i for some i. We then have
V i(X∗i +W ) > V i(X∗i),
hence by definition of an equilibrium p∗ ·W > 0.
Remark 1 1. Assertion one is weaker than the sufficient condition ∩
i
ri P i 6=
∅. Assertion 4 is weaker than the weak no-arbitrage price condition. We
see that there is a gap between the necessary and the sufficient conditions.
2. If V i is coherent for each i, then P i is convex compact, for each i. In that
case, it follows from Samet [23] that ∩
i
P i 6= ∅ is equivalent to the assertion:
there does not exist a set of trades W 1, . . . , Wn fulfilling Epi(W i) > 0 for
all pi ∈ P i and for all i and ∑iW i = 0.
3. Assertions 1 and 3 generalize to the infinite dimension.
Let us apply the previous proposition to the case where P i reduces to a unique
probability for all i .
Corollary 2 Let V i fulfill (4 ) for each i. Let P i = {pii} for all i. Then there
exists an equilibrium if and only if pii is independent of i.
Proof : The sufficient condition follows from corollary 1 while the necessary
condition from proposition 5.
4.3 Sup-convolution
We end this section by providing an alternative approach based on the sup-
convolution used by Barrieu and El Karoui [4], Filipovic and Kupper [9], Jouini
et al [15], Burgert and Ru¨schendorf [6] in an infinite dimensional framework.
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As is well known, from the monetary invariance, an attainable allocation is
Pareto optimal for aggregate endowment E if and only if it solves the following
problem:  sup
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi) subject to∑m
i=1X
i = E.
For X ∈ Rk, let
iV i(X) = sup
{
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi),
m∑
i=1
Xi = X
}
be the sup-convolution of the V i. Since V i is finite for every i, iV i(X) > −∞
and dom iV i = Rk if and only if ∩
i
dom ci = ∩
i
P i 6= ∅. In that case, iV i is
a monetary utility (the representative agent utility when aggregate endowment
is X) and iV i and
∑m
i=1 c
i are conjuguate. Furthermore, from Rockafellar’s
theorem 16.4 [22], a sufficient condition for existence of a Pareto optimum
(X1, . . . , Xm) is that
∩
i
ri dom ci = ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅. (11)
We thus reobtain by the sup-convolution approach, the Heath and Ku’s propo-
sition 4.2 sufficient condition for existence of a Pareto optimum.
Furthermore, let us show directly that (11) is a sufficient condition for ex-
istence of an equilibrium.
Let us first remark that pi ∈ ∂iV i(X) iff pi ∈ ∩
i
∂V i(Xi) for any Pareto opti-
mum (X1, . . . , Xm) associated with X. Indeed,
pi ∈ ∂iV i(X) iff iV i(X) =
m∑
i=1
ci(pi) + Epi(X).
Since iV i(X) =
∑m
i=1 V
i(Xi) for any Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xm) asso-
ciated with X and ci(pi) + Epi(Xi) − V i(Xi) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ 4, we obtain
that
V i(Xi) = ci(pi) + Epi(Xi) for all i, equivalently, pi ∈ ∩
i
∂V i(Xi)
Therefore, a pair ((X∗i)mi=1, p
∗) ∈ A×Rk\{0} is a contingent Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium, when aggregate endowment is E iff
1. (X∗i)mi=1 is Pareto optimal,
2. p∗ ∈ λ∂iV i(E) for some λ > 0,
3. p∗ ·X∗i = p∗ · Ei for all i.
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As remarked by Filipovic and Kupper [9], given a Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xm),
we may construct equilibria without using a fixed point theorem, because of the
axiom of monetary invariance. Indeed, given any p ∈ λ∂iV i(E), we claim that
(X1 + p · (E1 − X1), . . . , Xm + p · (Em − Xm), p) is an equilibrium. Indeed,
(X1 + p · (E1 −X1), . . . , Xm + p · (Em −Xm)) is Pareto optimal as
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi + p · (Ei −Xi)) =
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi) +
m∑
i=1
p · (Ei −Xi) =
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi)
since (X1, . . . , Xm) is attainable. By construction p fulfills assertion 2 and
p · (Xi + p · (Ei −Xi)) = p · Ei for all i.
5 Constraints on exchanges
5.1 The model
Constraints on exchanges when agents use measures of risk, have already be
discussed by Heath and Ku [14], Filipovic and Kupper [9] and Burgert and
Ru¨schendorf [6].
We now assume that trades are only possible in linear subspaces M i ⊆
Rk, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Agent i has an endowment Ei ∈ M i of contingent claims. The
definitions of attainable, individual rational and Pareto optimal allocations and
equilibria are extended by imposing the constraint that Xi ∈ M i for all i. In
particular, the set of constrained useful vectors for i is defined as
RM
i
= {W ∈M i | V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0}.
Therefore
RM
i
= {W ∈M i | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P} = Ri ∩M i
where Ri is the unconstrained set of useful vectors for i.
5.2 Weak no-arbitrage prices under constraints
In order to characterize weak no-arbitrage prices for this new economy, let us
first characterize R0
M i
the polar of the set of constrained useful vectors for i.
From Rockafellar’s corollary 16.4.2.,
(RM
i
)0 = cl((Ri)0 + (M i)⊥)
and from Rockafellar’s theorem 6.3 and corollary 6.6.2.
ri (RM
i
)0 = ri cl((Ri)0 + (M i)⊥) = ri ((Ri)0 + (M i)⊥) = ri (Ri)0 + (M i)⊥
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Using Rockafellar’s corollary 6.6.2., we obtain that
∩iSiw = ∩iri (RM
i
)0 = ∩i(riconeP i + (M i)⊥) = ∩icone (riP i + (M i)⊥)
hence,
∩iSiw 6= ∅ iff ∩icone (riP i + (M i)⊥) 6= ∅ (12)
Since (12) is positively homogeneous, let H = {m ∈ Rk | ∑jmj = 1}. The
set of weak no-arbitrage price is non empty if and on if there exists µ ∈ H such
that, for any i
µ = λipii +mi⊥
with pii ∈riP i and λi > 0 and mi⊥ ∈ (M i)⊥. The vector µ may be interpreted
as a signed measure and we have
Eµ(Xi) = λiEpii(X
i), for all Xi ∈M i and i (13)
with pii ∈riP i, λi > 0. Hence the restriction of µ to M i is a non-negative
measure proportionnal to a prior in the relative interior of P i. Furthermore,
• if agent i can trade the riskless asset or equivalently if constants belong
to M i, then λi =< µ, 1 >= 1.
• If all agents can trade the riskless asset, then λi is independent of i. (13)
may be rewritten as: there exists a signed measure µ and probabilities pii
in the relative interior of P i for each agent such that
Eµ(Xi) = Epii(X
i), for all Xi ∈M i and i (14)
• If all agents can trade the riskless asset and if M i = Rk for some i, then
µ is a probability measure and (13) holds true.
Remark 2 1. Condition (12) is equivalent to the WNMA condition: there
exists no set of net trades W 1, . . . ,Wn, with W i ∈ M i for all i and
Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i and all i with a strict inequality for some
i and pi ∈ P i and ∑iW i = 0.
2. The condition µ = λipii + mi⊥ for all i is very similar to the condition
one obtains when writing the no-arbitrage condition for finite financial
markets with constraints on portfolios.
3. We next show that we cannot dispense with the constants λi in (13).
Example 1
There are two states and three agents. Each of them has a unique proba-
bility over states: agent 1 has probability pi1 = (14 ,
3
4), agent 2 probability
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pi2 = (34 ,
1
4) and agent 3, probability pi
3 = (1, 0). Assume that the trading
sets are:
M1 = {X1 = (x1, x1) | x1 ∈ R}
M2 = {X2 = (x2,−x2) | x2 ∈ R}
M3 = {X3 = (x3, 0) | x3 ∈ R}.
The WNMA condition is fulfilled (or equivalently, there exists a Heath
and Ku Pareto equilibrium) since RM
1
= {W 1 = (w,w) | w ≥ 0},
RM
2
= {W 2 = (w,−w) | w ≥ 0} and RM3 = {W 3 = (w, 0) | w ≥ 0}
and
∑
iW
i = 0 implies W i = 0 for all i. But there exists no solution
µ = (µ1, µ2) to the following system:
Eµ(X1) = (µ1 + µ2)x1 = Epi1(X
1) = x1, for all x1 ∈ R,
Eµ(X2) = (µ1 − µ2)x2 = Epi2(X2) = 1/2x2, for all x2 ∈ R,
Eµ(X3) = µ1x3 = Epi3(X
3) = x3, for all x3 ∈ R.
since the first and the third equations imply µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0 which is
incompatible with the second equation.
Example 2
There are three agents. The state space and the probabilities are as in
Example 1 as well as the trading sets of agents 1 and 2. The trading set
of agent 3 is M3 = R2. Hence, RM3 = {W 3 = (w31, w32) | w31 ≥ 0}. As in
the previous example, the WNMA condition is fulfilled. However, there
exists no solution µ = (µ1, µ2) to the following system:
Eµ(X1) = (µ1 + µ2)x1 = Epi1(X
1) = x1, for all X1 ∈M1,
Eµ(X2) = (µ1 − µ2)x2 = Epi2(X2) = 1/2x2, for all X2 ∈M1,
Eµ(X3) = µ1x31 + µ2x
3
2 = Epi3(X
3) = x31, for all X
3 ∈M3.
since the third equation implies µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0 which is incompatible with
the second equation.
4. Finally, we give an example where the agents have the same trading set
which contains the riskless asset but the intersection of the sets of priors
is empty.
Example 3
The state space and the probabilities are as in Example 1, the trading sets
are
M1 =M2 =M3 = {(x, x) | x ∈ R}.
Here RM
1
= RM
2
= RM
3
= {(w,w) | w ≥ 0}. Hence, the WNMA
condition is fulfilled but ∩iP i = ∅.
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Let us summarize the results obtained in a proposition:
Proposition 6 Let V i fulfill (4) and agent’s i trading set be the subspace M i
for each i. Then the following are equivalent:
1. there exists a signed measure µ and positive constants λi and probabilities
pii ∈riP i such that (13) holds true,
2. there exists no set of net trades W 1, . . . ,Wn, with W i ∈M i for all i and
Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i and all i with a strict inequality for some i
and pi ∈ P i and ∑iW i = 0.
Any of the previous assertions implies the existence of efficient allocations
or of an equilibrium.
5.3 Sup-convolution and constraints
Assuming to simplify that agents can all trade the riskless asset, let us return
to the inf-convolution’s approach. Define for each i
VM
i
(X) =
{
V i(X) if X ∈M i
−∞, otherwise (15)
The function VM
i
: Rk → R ∪ {−∞} is concave, upper semi-continuous, cash
invariant but fails to be monotone. We may still use duality methods but the
domain of the conjuguate function is larger than the probability simplex. Let
m ∈ Rk and
cM
i
(m) = sup
X∈Rk
VM
i
(X)− < m,X >= sup
X∈M i
VM
i
(X)− < m,X > (16)
be the conjuguate of VM
i
. Clearly we have
cM
i
(m+m⊥) = cM
i
(m), for all m⊥ ∈ (M i)⊥ (17)
From the cash invariance of VM
i
, we also have
cM
i
(m) = sup
X∈M i, a∈R
VM
i
(X)− < m,X > +a(1− < m, 1 >)
therefore cM
i
(m) =∞ if 1 6=< m, 1 >. Defining H = {m ∈ Rk | ∑jmj = 1},
we thus have that dom cM
i ⊆ H.
For m ∈ P i, cM i(m) ≤ ci(m) <∞. Hence
dom cM
i
= (P i + (M i)⊥) ∩H
The function iVM
i
<∞ if and only if ∩
i
dom cM
i
= ∩
i
(P i+(M i)⊥)∩H 6= ∅.
In that case, since iVM
i
> −∞ on ∑iM i, dom iVM i 6= ∅ and iVM i is
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proper, henceiVM
i
and
∑m
i=1 c
M i are conjuguate. From Rockafellar’s theorem
16.4 [22], a sufficient condition for existence of a Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xm)
is that
∩
i
ri dom cM
i
= ∩
i
(ri (P i) + (M i)⊥) ∩H 6= ∅. (18)
We are thus back to the weak no-arbitrage condition (12).
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